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Abstract
We analyze the best price clauses (BPCs) of online travel agents (OTAs) using
meta-search price data of more than 45,000 hotels in different countries. Although
OTAs apparently have not changed their standard commission rates following the
partial ban of BPCs in Europe, we find that BPCs do influence the pricing and
availability of hotel rooms across online sales channels. In particular, the abolition
of Booking.com’s narrow BPC is associated with the hotels’ direct channel being
the price leader more often. Moreover, hotels make rooms more often available at
Booking.com when it does not use the narrow BPC.
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1 Introduction
Motivated by recent proceedings against best price clauses (BPC) imposed by online
travel agents (OTA), we empirically investigate the effects of such clauses using meta-
search price data of more than 45,000 hotels in various countries.1 Under a BPC, an OTA
obliges the hotel not to charge a higher price on the OTA than on certain other channels.
The NCAs in Europe generally agreed that best price clauses could restrict competition
between OTAs for commission rates, but eventually arrived at different assessments and
decisions.2 These differences trigger the question how BPCs actually affect the market
outcome. The theoretical literature on this topic is indeed evolving rapidly. While several
articles predict impeded OTA competition and an inflated price level for wide BPCs
(Johnson (2014) and Boik and Corts (2016)), others find ambiguous effects of narrow
BPCs (Edelman and Wright (2015) and Wang and Wright (2015)). In contrast to the
theoretical research on this topic, the empirical research is very limited. With this article
we start to fill the gap.
We use the variation in the BPCs due to different national enforcement policies across
various countries and over time. The different decisions of the European competition
authorities seem to be rather due to differences in their assessments than to fundamental
differences in the market characteristics in each country (see Hunold (2016)). For instance,
the French competition authority had accepted Booking.com’s commitments to narrow
down the parity clauses in April 2015, just to be overruled by the French parliament that
completely prohibited BPCs of OTAs in France in July 2015. These different decisions
provide a quasi-experimental setup for assessing the effects of different BPC policies.
As prohibitions of BPCs generally aim at enhancing OTA competition, one would expect
to observe changes in the commission rates that hotels have to pay to the OTA for every
mediated booking. However, according to our research, the standard commission rates of
the major OTAs have not changed since the competition policy interventions in Europe.3
Therefore, we focus in this article on the effects of BPCs on the hotels’ choices of price
1In this article, we generally refer to hotels as the typical accommodations on offer at a booking
platform. In its general terms and conditions, Booking.com uses the term “accommodation”. Other
types of accommodation present on OTAs include, for example, holiday apartments.
2See Annex IV for a list of the different decisions.
3See Annex III for details.
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publications and levels across OTAs and the hotels’ direct online channel.
We use data on prices of hotel rooms on different online sales channels of the period
January to July 2016 collected from Kayak.4 Kayak is a meta travel search engine that
collects information from various online channels such as the OTAs Booking.com, Expedia
and the direct online hotel channels. Our empirical approach is twofold: First, we point
out a set of interesting observations in relation to channel choice and pricing decisions
across channels by means of cross sectional statistics. Second, we exploit the variation
over time to identify the effects of the narrow BPCs by means of a difference-in-differences
approach. We use the fact that Booking.com is prohibited to use its narrow BPCs in
Germany since February 2016.5 We therefore compare the changes in the market outcome
in Germany with the changes in other countries without such a change in the relevant
time frame. For this, we use regression analyses to control for possibly confounding
factors. Our identifying assumption in this case is that there are no other country specific
developments since January 2016 – except for the ones which we can control for, such as
the utilization rates of hotels at the city level.
With respect to the price structure across sales channels, we find that hotels set the price
at the direct channel lower than at the largest OTA Booking.com in about one third of
our observations across all BPC regimes. Nevertheless, the data suggest that especially
the wide BPC is effective in constraining price dispersion across sales channels to some
extent. The finding of lower direct channel prices suggest a wide-spread non-compliance
with the price parity clause and is important for both conceptual work and competition
policy. If one out of three hotels does not comply with the BPCs, this is likely to reduce
the possible anti-competitive effects of BPCs compared to a situation where all hotels
comply. At the same time the result indicates a strong incentive for hotels to attract
direct channel bookings, which can be assumed to typically have the lowest marginal
costs for hotels.
We find an increased channel use which can be attributed to the abolition of Booking.com’s
narrow BPC in Germany. We observe that more hotels start using Booking.com as a dis-
4We use the German edition of the internet site www.kayak.de. Since 2013, Kayak is a subsidiary of
the Priceline Group, which previously also acquired the online travel agencies Booking.com (2004) and
Agoda.com (2007).
5See Subsection 2.2 for a precise definition of wide and narrow BPCs and Annex IV for an overview
of the decisions.
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tribution channel (extensive use) after it had to remove the price parity and minimum
availability clauses in relation to the direct channel in Germany, when compared to the
developments in other countries. This result suggests that a fraction of the hotels does
indeed respond flexibly to parity clauses by not being active at an OTA imposing them.
The fraction of previously inactive hotels had apparently not been large enough for Book-
ing.com to prefer to not use a BPC. The increase in hotels using a narrow BPC should
nevertheless now benefit Booking.com as a side effect of the narrow BPC prohibition.
Moreover, we also observe an increased use of the direct online channel (intensive use)
which indicates that hotels find it increasingly attractive to use this channel since it is no
more constrained by Booking.com’s narrow BPC.
With respect to the adjustment process after the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC
in Germany, our difference-in-differences approach reveals that hotels are able to establish
the direct channel more frequently as the cheaper channel relative to the major OTAs and
also more frequently as the price leader in the sense of the cheapest channel across all
available online sales channels. This lets us conclude that Booking.com’s narrow BPC
did restrict the hotel’s price setting. It contributes to the discussion of whether there is
a free-riding problem in that hotels might use the OTAs to show their rooms but induce
customers with lower prices to eventually book directly.
In two instances we observe a similar development as for Booking.com in Germany after
the abolition of its narrow BPC. First, the price relation between Expedia and the direct
channel evolves similarly to the relation between Booking.com and the direct channel
in Germany, despite the fact that Expedia still has its narrow BPC in place. This de-
velopment indicates an increasing non-compliance with Expedia’s price parity. Second,
with regard to the publication decisions and the price leadership of the direct channel,
we find for Austria a time trend that is not significantly different or even stronger than
in Germany. Like for Expedia in Germany, we understand that Booking.com and Ex-
pedia still use narrow BPCs in Austria. However, the German competition authority
(Bundeskartellamt) is apparently still investigating the narrow BPC of Expedia and also
Austria is further proceeding against narrow BPCs of OTAs. Therefore, we conclude
that hotels anticipate prohibitions of these BPCs and that enforcement of these clauses
becomes more difficult for Expedia in Germany and for both Booking.com and Expedia
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in Austria.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. We discuss the related literature in
the next section, provide background information about OTAs, BPCs and competition
policy in Section 3, introduce the data in Section 4, discuss conjectures, methodology and
identification in Section 5, the analysis of price publications across channels in Section 6,
the pricing analysis in Section 7, and then conclude in Section 8.
2 Related literature
2.1 Theory in relation to BPCs
The theory of harm with respect to wide BPCs is generally supported by recent theoretical
research. Boik and Corts (2016) and Johnson (2014) analyze BPCs in a model in which
customers can only purchase through a platform and in which platforms compete in
revenue-sharing contracts. Boik and Corts (2016) show that BPCs lead to an increase in
retail prices and platform fees. Moreover, higher platform profits may raise incentives for
potential entrants, but market entry of lower-cost, lower-value platforms is exacerbated
due to price parity and therefore BPCs also impose a large obstacle on market entry.
Johnson (2014) investigates the difference between the agency model, where hotels set
prices through the platform and pay a commission for every transaction, and the merchant
model, where the platform acts as retailer of hotel rooms. While Johnson (2014) finds a
neutral effect of BPCs in the wholesale model, he shows that BPCs adopted in the agency
model result in higher retail prices, lower hotel’s profits and a maximization of platform’s
profits. He also shows that BPCs tend to endogenously emerge in the agency model.
Edelman and Wright (2015) and Wang and Wright (2015) assume that platforms charge
linear per-transaction fees and allow customers to buy from either the platform or the
direct channel. Edelman and Wright (2015) refer to BPCs as price coherence and find
incentives for excessive investment in convenience benefits. This leads to even higher
prices and negative “externalities on nontraders” in line with Segal (1999), i.e. consumers
who do not use the platform are harmed by price parity, due to a higher price level.
Wang and Wright (2015) expand the setting by allowing the customers to search on the
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platform and switch the sales channel to complete the transaction. To our knowledge
they are the first who allow for the possibility that consumers search on OTAs and then
book at a lower price on the direct channel. This allows them to address an important
aspect in the ongoing discussion of the competitive effects of narrow BPC. They show
that showrooming effectively disciplines the platforms’ incentives to raise commissions,
but may make platforms unviable – depending on its marginal costs and the extent of
convenience benefits that the platform offers to the customers.
2.2 Empirical literature in relation to OTAs
As discussed above, there is sound economic theory that BPCs of OTAs have the potential
to restrict competition among OTAs for commission rates and deter entry. Yet, it remains
an empirical question whether and – if yes – by how much the wide and narrow BPCs
of OTAs affect the market outcome. However, to our knowledge, there are not yet any
research articles available which address this question. There is though related research
that investigates i) the pricing at online marketplaces, and ii) search behavior of consumers
on platforms such as OTAs.
Several articles study online prices of various goods and services (Brynjolfsson and Smith
(2000), Clemons et al. (2002), Chellappa et al. (2011) Gorodnichenko et al. (2014) and
Kaplan et al. (2016)). They find that online prices are often lower and adjusted more fre-
quently than oﬄine prices. Moreover, online prices exhibit considerable price dispersion.
Ghose and Yao (2011) and Zhao et al. (2015) compare list prices with transaction prices
and find that price dispersion is prevalent in both, but less so in transaction prices. Our
work is related in that we also find considerable dispersion of hotel room prices online.
More closely related are Lu et al. (2015) who study the relationship between the pricing
of intermediaries, such as physical travel agents, and the introduction of a new online
direct sales channel of a hotel chain. Using data of hotel room transactions from 2001 to
2007, they analyze the introduction of the direct online sales channel in 2002 and find a
significant reduction of the intermediaries’ price premia. This result suggests that there
is competition between different form of sales channels for hotel distribution. However,
Lu et al. do not study BPCs.
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Another stream of empirical literature seeks to explain consumer’s search behavior of
OTAs and the role of their hotel rankings. Ursu (2015) exploiting a random variation
in the ranking of the OTA Expedia studies the effect of rankings on search and booking
behavior. She finds direct effects of rankings on search costs and that better ranking
positions are associated with more clicks on the particular offer, i.e. the higher an offer
is ranked the higher is the probability that customers click on the offer in order to obtain
detailed information on this offer. However, she finds that once a customer has clicked on
an offer, the probability for a booking is not influenced by the ranking position. Ghose
et al. (2012) also stress that ranking quality has a large impact on search costs and has
an increasing importance due to social media overload. They propose a structural model
in order to predict consumers’ online search paths and thereby improve search engine
performance. In the context of hotel room booking they find that a high quality ranking
can save customers (in money equivalents) up to 9.38 USD per hotel booking. In general,
these results highlight the importance of intermediary services in hotel online distribution
as provided by OTAs. In the following section we point out recent developments of the
hotel online market and introduce the analysis in the subsequent sections.
3 Background information on online hotel booking
3.1 Market development
With the emergence of OTAs, hotel distribution has increasingly shifted to online market
places (Buhalis and Law (2008)). The importance of traditional oﬄine sales channels such
as bookings via walk-ins or via telephone is declining correspondingly. As the advance
of information and communication technology has resulted in an increasingly complex
array of intermediaries (Kracht and Wang (2010)), this shift is accompanied by a general
trend to less bookings via the hotels’ direct oﬄine channels to a more extensive use of
intermediary services offered e.g. from OTAs or meta-search engines. In recent years, the
internet has become the primary information source for trip planning purposes (Xiang
et al. (2015)). Today, especially social media and the adoption of mobile devices exert
an increasing impact on the customer’s travel planning and booking behavior. Recent
studies empirically confirm the growing importance of online distribution channels and
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an increasing importance of intermediary services.
A HOTREC survey among more than 2,000 European hoteliers finds that direct bookings
account for 55% of all bookings and have dropped by 4 percentage points (pp) since
2013, while the direct online channel has remained approximately constant at close to
7%. Bookings via OTAs have increased by 3 pp to 22% in the same time frame.6 The
survey also shows an increasing concentration in online hotel booking. Among bookings
via OTAs, the three major OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS account together for
more than 90% of all bookings. The increased availability of distinct sales channels opens
the possibility to adopt a multi-channel distribution strategy for the hotels. Stangl et
al. (2016) find in a country study for Germany, Austria and Switzerland that hotels on
average use eight distinct oﬄine and online channel categories and have prices published
at 3.6 OTAs. As we explain in more detail in subsection 6, this finding is consistent with
the data collected from Kayak in which we observe that hotels are usually present at more
than one online channel (i.e. they multi-home). According to our data (see Subsection
4.2), hotels publish room offers on average at 4.4 online sales channels (OTAs and the
direct online channel).
3.2 Best price clauses and competition policy
The NCAs in Europe generally agreed that wide best price clauses restrict competition
between OTAs for commission rates that hotels have to pay for every booking at an OTA.7
Under a wide BPC, an OTA obliges the hotel not to charge a higher price on the OTA
than on almost any other booking channel, which in particular includes other OTAs and
the hotel’s own direct sales channels.8 For a hotel which complies with the wide BPCs
and which is present at more than one OTA, as is typically the case, an OTA lowering
its commission rate cannot expect to become the price leader because the hotel is not
allowed to pass on this cost reduction into lower prices at just this OTA.
6HOTREC (2016) Survey on Hotel Online Distribution (http://www.tophotel.de/20-news/7186-
hotrec-studie-die-macht-der-online-buchungsportale-nimmt-zu.html, last accessed 30 July, 2016).
7Bundeskartellamt (2015) par. 167, Konkurrensverket (2015) par. 21-22, Autorité de la concurrence
par. 115-122, Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (2015) par. 6-8. See Annex IV for more
detailed references of the decisions.
8Non-public loyalty schemes, contracts with enterprises and (physical) travel agencies were usually
excluded from this BPC. In addition to the price parity on (almost) all sales channels, the wide BPCs
required that the offer regarding all other conditions is at least as good as the offer on other sales channels,
and that the hotel offers at least the same room availability to the OTA as in other channels.
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Different from the common view that wide BPCs restrict competition for commission
rates, the European NCAs disagreed on whether narrow BPCs likewise effectively restrict
competition among OTAs. Narrow BPCs prohibit the hotel from publishing lower prices
on its direct online sales channels than at the OTA that imposes the clause. However,
a narrow BPC does not contractually restrict the hotel’s room prices at other OTAs. In
line with the different assessments, the NCAs reached quite different decisions.9
Germany’s Bundeskartellamt prohibited all BPCs of the OTA HRS – the former number
one in Germany – already in December 2013. In April 2015, the NCAs in France, Italy
and Sweden instead accepted Booking.com’s commitment to use at most narrow BPCs
in Europe from July 2015 onward. Expedia followed by announcing in July 2015 to use a
similar narrow BPC in Europe.
However, the narrow BPCs have been challenged in various countries shortly after their
establishment. The French parliament overturned the NCA’s acceptance of narrow BPCs
already in July 2015 with a law that generally prohibits BPCs of OTAs. In December
2015, the German NCA prohibited the by then narrower clauses of Booking.com and is
continuing the investigation against Expedia. Outside of Europe, instead, we understand
that major OTAs still use wide BPCs in various countries.
4 Data
4.1 Data source Kayak
We use Kayak data on prices of hotel rooms on different online sales channels.10 Kayak
is a meta travel search engine that collects information from various online channels such
as the OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and the direct online channel. We understand that
Kayak derives revenues from advertising placements on its websites and mobile apps and
from sending referrals to travel service providers and OTAs.11
9See Annex IV for a list of the different decisions.
10We use the German edition of the internet site www.kayak.de. Since 2013, Kayak is a subsidiary of
the Priceline Group, which previously also acquired the online travel agencies Booking.com (2004) and
Agoda.com (2007).
11Priceline Group Inc. Annual Report 2015 (p.2). See http://ir.pricelinegroup.com/annuals.cfm; last
accessed 25 September, 2016.
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There are two different kinds of information about hotels that appear on Kayak.12 First,
general information such as a description of the hotel, the location and contact details.
Second, information on availabilities and prices can be submitted to Kayak in real time.
In order to provide this information on Kayak, a hotel can either be listed with an OTA
or it can make use of its own booking engine or a third-party booking engine provider.13
A typical Kayak request consists of a travel destination, the travel dates, the number of
travelers and the number of rooms, e.g. two persons looking for one room in Rome for an
overnight stay in two weeks from today. Kayak uses the information provided from OTAs
and the hotels’ direct sales channels to display a list of available hotels. For every hotel,
Kayak lists the prices of the available sales channels.14 We refer to the list of all available
sales channels for a particular hotel at a particular travel date as a ’Kayak request’.
We collect Kayak prices for all listed hotels from a wide range of cities:
• the 25 biggest German cities,
• a selection of 20 pairs of German and non-German cities near the German border,
and
• a list of the fifteen biggest cities and fifteen popular tourist destinations for the five
countries Austria, Italy, Sweden, France and Canada.
Data is being collected from January 26, 2016 onward. The corresponding list of locations
and starting dates for data collection can be found in Annex I. Data collection takes place
on a daily basis from various servers inside Germany. Prices are collected for overnight
stays for two persons in one room on the same day and the 7th, 14th, 21th and 28th day
ahead.15
In the Kayak data we observe 73 distinct sales channels which can be classified as OTAs
and direct channels. Some OTAs belong to the same company group (see Annex V for
12See https://www.kayak.com/hotelowner; last accessed 10 August, 2016.
13Booking engines are provider that offer the services necessary to connect the hotel to Kayak such as
Fastbooking, Travelclick or Derbysoft.
14Also, Kayak sometimes includes itself in the list of hotel price offers. However, a click on the “Kayak
offer” redirects to OTAs which also belong to the Priceline Group such as Booking.com. Therefore,
whenever we observe a Kayak entry, we substitute it with the corresponding underlying Priceline OTA
and eliminate potential duplicates.
15On certain dates, we were able to collect prices for more travel dates than 0, 7, 14, 21 and 28 days
in advance of the booking date, e.g for all days within a 30 day period between booking and travel date,
but due to technical difficulties on some days we collected less data. In the analysis, only the observation
with travel dates 0, 7, 14, 21 and 28 days ahead are included.
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details). Among the direct channel listings, two categories can be distinguished. On the
one hand, there are hotels that make use of a third party service provider that supplies the
software necessary in order to connect to Kayak. On the other hand, there are hotels that
make use of their own technological interface to transmit information to Kayak. Kayak
displays the direct channel price of a hotel and provides a link to the hotel’s own website.
We take this into account for our analyses where necessary.
4.2 Summary statistics of the Kayak data set
The period of observation ranges from January 2016 until July 2016. Each observation in
the data set refers to a hotel room at a specific travel date which is on offer at a certain
search date. For each search request we observe all available sales channels listed on
Kayak. In total, the data set consists of more than 15 million observations. On average, a
hotel has prices posted on 4.35 online sales channels (OTAs and direct channel). In 68%
of all observations we find that hotels have published prices on at least two channels.
The average price is at 118 EUR, ranging from 5 EUR to 19,997 EUR.16 Conditional that
the hotel has prices published on at least two platforms, the average standard deviation of
prices is 14 EUR. The corresponding average coefficient of variation between all available
price offers in one Kayak request is 0.09. In 49% of all observations with at least two
channels, there is a strict minimum price. For the observations with strict minimum
price, the average difference between the lowest and second lowest price is at 14% of the
lowest price.
The average hotel category in the data set is 2.4 stars out of five, the average Kayak
rating is at 8 out of 10 points. However, the latter variable is only available in 82% of
all observations. Kayak states both the number of hotels in a city listed with offers at
a certain travel date and the total number of hotels in the city. We use the fraction of
hotels that are not listed with offers at a certain travel date over all hotels as a measure
of local hotel occupancy. It has an average value of 61%.
Two dates have to be distinguished: The date when we searched for a hotel and the
planned travel date. When we refer to dates in the subsequent analysis we mean the
search dates, if not stated otherwise.
16Prices above 20,000 EUR were excluded.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Number of listings 4.35 3.63 1 24 15187685
At least two listings 0.68 0.47 0 1 15187685
Mean price in Euro 117.74 128.22 5 19996.5 15187685
Std.Dev. price 13.98 72.71 0 13611.1 10471241
Coefficient of Variation 0.09 0.15 0 3.61 10471241
Strict minimum price exists 0.49 0.5 0 1 10367780
Rel. diff. (str.) first two lowest prices 0.14 1.34 0 349.84 5132018
Hotel category in stars 2.4 1.43 0 5 15187685
Kayak hotel rating 8.07 0.9 1.7 10 12456889
Percentage of non-listed hotels 0.61 0.16 0 1 15173151
4.3 Validation of price accuracy on Kayak
In order to validate the accuracy of the Kayak data, we manually conducted a comparison
of prices and qualitative features between hotel offers on www.kayak.de with correspond-
ing offers on the websites of the major OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS and the
hotels. The comparison sample includes 171 booking requests for travel dates ranging
from June to August 2016. As we observe more than one channel per request on Kayak,
we validated the price accuracy between Kayak and the channel price in 255 cases. Simi-
larly, we investigate for every channel whether it is the price leader in the corresponding
Kayak request and whether this information on the price structure is maintained on the
sales channels. With this validation we check in 181 cases the correctness of the price
structure across channels. For a detailed description of the validation analysis see Annex
II.
Our manual check revealed that in general the qualitative features of a hotel room offer,
such as the cancellation policy and whether breakfast is included, are identical on Kayak
and on the actual sales channels, whenever rooms are available on both sources.17 How-
ever, we did observe deviations between Kayak prices and the prices on OTAs and the
hotel websites in various instances. In particular, prices on Kayak tend to be higher than
on the sales channels in one quarter of all observations. Nevertheless, in two-thirds of
all the 255 cases in which Kayak price and channel price are comparable, prices on both
sources virtually coincide within a tolerance range of ± 3 EUR. With a tolerance of ± 5
EUR the prices are consistent in approximately 3 out of 4 cases. With regard to the order
17In three cases (Booking.com twice, HRS once) Kayak displayed available rooms while there was no
offer on the corresponding sales channel.
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of prices across channels, we find that the price leader is correctly detected by Kayak in
more than 90% of all cases. Furthermore, we cannot identify systematic differences in the
errors that would indicate a favorable treatment of a particular channel. These findings
reassure us that the Kayak is an adequate source for our evaluation of the price structure
across sales channels in relation to differences of the BPCs.
5 Conjectures, identification and methodology
As discussed in the introduction, the focus of the present article is to analyze on which
channels hotel room offers are published and the price setting behavior of hotels across
channels in relation to BPCs. Recall that a BPC restricts price differentiation to the
extent that hotels may not charge prices on channels covered by the BPC below the price
charged at the OTA imposing the clause. Moreover, there are related clauses, such as
availability parity for wide, and a minimum availability requirement for narrow BPCs.
These further restrict a hotel’s sales strategy. A hotel might only be able to avoid an
availability clause by not doing business with an OTA at all. The decision of where to
publish prices might thus depend on which parity clauses are in place. Subsequently, we
formulate conjectures in relation to both publishing and pricing decision.
5.1 Conjectures in relation to the decision on which channels a
hotel publishes prices
An OTA’s price parity clause constrains the price setting behavior of a hotel. Such a BPC
can make it unprofitable for some hotels to sign a contract with this particular OTA. A
reduction of price parity clauses could, therefore, induce more hotels to start publishing
room prices on that OTA or on other channels for which the hotel was too constrained
before.
The removal or reduction of an availability parity clause might have opposing effects on
the hotels’ publishing decisions at the intensive and the extensive margin. Under Book-
ing.com’s wide parity clauses, for example, the availability parity requires a hotel always
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to offer at least the same availabilities at Booking.com as on any other OTA. Under their
new narrow parity clauses, neither Booking nor Expedia apply room availability parity,
either in relation to other OTAs, or in relation to the hotel’s own website. However, Book-
ing.com does require the hotel to make available on Booking.com’s website a minimum
allocation of rooms.18
An availability requirement might thus induce hotels to generally publish prices on fewer
channels (extensive margin) – in particular some hotels might prefer to not become active
at an OTA that requires availability. In summary, the reduction of both price and avail-
ability parity clauses should increase the incentives for hotels to make prices available at
more OTAs. We particularly expect more publications at the OTA that reduces its BPC
and therefore test
Conjecture 1. A decrease in the scope of a the parity clauses (in particular price and
availability) results in more price publications at the extensive margin, and in particular
at the OTA which has reduced the BPC.
At the same time, we expect that an availability parity increases the number of channels
with price publicatins at the intensive margin when hotels are obliged to post all their
room offers also at the OTA. Following the reduction of a parity clause, hotels might use
the new freedom to occasionally reduce offers at an OTA if they are able to sell their rooms
on more profitable channels. To the contrary, an abolished price parity could increase the
profitability of a more diversified channel use and therefore induce hotels registered at an
OTA to be listed more often.
As we investigate listing decisions at the extensive and at the intensive margin, we are
able to distinguish between effects of the availability parity and the price parity on the
intensive publishing decisions. Especially, the net effect on the intensive channel use gives
an indication which parity predominantly constrains hotels in their publishing decisions.
If it is positive, intensive channel use increases in reaction to a decrease in the scope of a
BPC. This would indicate that the effect of the price parity clause dominates. If the net
effect is negative at the OTA that imposed the constraint, this would indicate that the
availability parity has been the more important constraint.
18For Booking.com refer to https://news.booking.com/bookingcom-announces-support-of-new-
commitments-in-europe and for Expedia to http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Articles/26715/Expedia-
amends-rate-parity-clauses; last accessed 28 September, 2016.
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However, as noted in the introduction, the availability parity can be interpreted as an
ancillary clause to prevent circumvention of the price parity clause. In addition with the
fact that under the narrow parity clauses the availability parity is considerably weaker
than under the wide, we expect that in the case of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany
the price parity clause imposes a larger constraint on price publications at the intensive
margin than the availability parity. As a consequence of the expected prevalence of the
price parity, we additionally expect that a reduction of a BPC mainly affects the channels
that get increased price setting freedom from this reduction. In particular, if a channel
was covered by the BPC and regains price setting freedom from the BPC reduction, the
hotel should find it profitable to make use of this channel more frequently. Therefore:
Conjecture 2. A decrease in the scope of a BPC results in a higher frequency of price
publications at the intensive margin and mainly affects the channels that are no longer
covered by the BPC.
5.2 Conjectures in relation to pricing across channels
In addition to the publications of room offers across channels, the second major question
is how BPCs relate to the price structure for a hotel room across several distribution
channels. There are various reasons why a hotel might want to charge different prices on
different distribution channels. These include different
• distribution costs across channels;
• elasticities of demand on each channel because different customers or competitors
are active on the channel;
• costs to adjust prices on each channel.
Online prices of goods and services – including hotel rooms – generally exhibit considerable
price dispersion across different distribution channels (Ghose and Yao (2011), Sun et
al. (2015)). For a hotel the direct channel is likely to typically have lower marginal
distribution costs per booking than an OTA booking because no OTA commission needs
to be paid. The recent endeavors of hotel associations to take measures against the BPC
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such as the “Book Direct” campaign of HOTREC19 confirm that hotels typically have an
interest to capture as many bookings as possible via the direct channel. Hotels might,
therefore, have an incentive to set lower prices on the direct channel than on OTAs where
they have to pay commission fee for every mediated booking and the same transaction is,
therefore, less profitable. Hence, we test
Conjecture 3. The direct channel price is typically not above the price at an OTA using
a BPC.
A BPC obliges hotels not to charge lower prices on channels that are covered by the BPC
than the price charged at the OTA imposing the clause. Therefore, we test
Conjecture 4. The channel prices that are covered by a BPC are not below the price at
the OTA that imposes the BPC.
We also analyze (strict) price leadership in the sense that there is one channel offering
the (strictly) lowest price among all channels in one Kayak request. Which channel is the
price leader for a given hotel is important for hotel online distribution. At least a fraction
of the customers should prefer to book at the lowest price possible.
BPCs require prices of other channels to be larger or equal compared to the price of the
OTA that imposes the BPC. Accordingly, there should be less often a strict price leader
across channels when several BPCs are in effect. Therefore, we test
Conjecture 5. The wider the scope of the BPCs of the major OTAs, the less frequently
there is a strict price leader across channels.
Conjectures 3, 4 and 5 can be related to static differences across BPC regimes. As we
have also captured the removal of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany, we can also
take changes in the price structure associated with a decrease in the scope of a BPC into
account. The narrow BPC obliged hotels to not set a lower price at the direct channel
than at Booking.com. We therefore test
Conjecture 6. Hotels price their direct online channel below the OTA more often once
the OTA removes its narrow BPC.
19See http://www.hotrec.eu/bookdirect.aspx; last accessed 31 August, 2016.
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In Germany, the only major OTA that still imposes a narrow BPC is Expedia. As
Booking.com removed its narrow BPC, hotels may now consider it profitable to decrease
prices at Expedia and the direct channel without having to maintain price parity between
the direct channel and Booking.com. Given this asymmetry, we test
Conjecture 7. In Germany, hotels set prices at Expedia more often below the prices at
Booking.com after Booking.com abolished its narrow BPC.
This conjecture hinges on the question whether it is attractive for hotels to set lower
prices at Expedia. This could be the case if the value-for-money is higher at Expedia
than at Booking.com. As we have not found evidence for reduced commission rates
following the changes in the BPC, it is possible that the price relation between Expedia
and Booking.com does not change due to more intense competition. Therefore, this
conjecture might also be interpreted as an additional test for increased OTA competition
between Booking.com and Expedia.
One might wonder whether, following the prohibition of Booking.com’s BPC, the narrow
BPC of Expedia prevents hotels from setting the direct online channel prices below all
OTA prices to become the price leader. We conjecture that there is still scope for such
a strategy, either because a hotel is not active at Expedia, or because a hotel violates
Expedia’s BPC. The ongoing investigation of the German competition authority against
the narrow BPCs of Expedia might encourage hotels to assume that the clause will not
be enforced by Expedia anymore. We therefore test
Conjecture 8. The hotel’s direct online channel becomes the strict price leader more
frequently once an OTA removes its narrow BPC.
5.3 Methodology
Our empirical approach is twofold: First, we point out a set of interesting observations in
relation to channel choice and pricing decisions across countries and channels by means
of cross section statistics. We analyze data of the following countries20:
1. Countries without BPCs: Currently France and Germany (in Germany at least HRS
and since February 2016 also Booking.com; Expedia still has a narrow BPC).
20See Annex I for a detailed overview of countries and cities covered.
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2. Narrow BPC countries: All EU member states except for Germany and France as
regards the major OTAs Booking.com and Expedia. Our data captures mainly Italy,
Sweden and Austria, as well as various cities close to the German border.
3. Wide BPC countries: Today only non-EU countries as regards at least the major
OTAs Booking.com and Expedia. We have collected data for Canada.
Second, we analyze the developments in Germany and how these differ from the other
countries. For this, we use regression analyses to control for possibly confounding factors.
Hotel fixed effects are used in all regressions in order to control for unobserved heterogene-
ity across hotels and thereby composition effects over time. Factors like the hotel size, the
type of the hotel (hotel chain, independent hotel, hotel garni, etc.) or the management’s
price and distribution strategy are in general likely to influence the decision of a hotel
where to publish prices and how to set prices across channels. We assume these factors to
stay constant during the period of observation and thus to be covered by the fixed effects.
Note that also other time constant observed variables such as hotel stars or country are
not included in the analysis.
In the estimations we exploit the within hotel variation. If not stated differently, we
include as control variables the time interval between booking date and travel date, the
weekday of the first travel day and the share of non-available hotels. The latter serves as
an approximation for the occupancy in the city where the hotel is located. All regressions
are computed such that Germany is the reference country.
Due to high computational effort in case of fixed effects, we conduct the regressions on
dichotomous indicator variables with the linear probability model (LPM) rather than with
an index model such as probit and logit. Although such a non-linear model is theoretically
a more rigorous approach, we follow Wooldridge (2010) that the LPM often yields good
estimates of the partial effects on the response probability. Standard errors are computed
to be robust to heteroscedasticity.
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5.4 Identification
Conjectures 3 and 4 relate to differences across BPC regimes. We investigate these partly
with cross section statistics which capture differences in the BPCs across countries. The
identifying assumption here is that differences across countries are due to the different
BPC regimes. We cannot exclude, however, that there are also other country-specific
differences which affect our measures, such as the variation of prices across channels.
Nevertheless, we consider this a useful first step given the limited empirical evidence that
is available so far.
Importantly, we observe variation in the BPC regime over time in Germany. The latest
prohibition decision in Germany was taken in December 2015 against Booking.com, with
the obligation for Booking.com to remove the narrow BPC by February 2016.21 We use
this variation to test conjectures 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, which relate to adjustment processes after
the reduction of the scope of a BPC. For this, we compare the changes in the market
outcome in Germany with the changes in other countries without such a change of the
BPCs in the relevant time frame. Our identifying assumption in this case is that there are
no other country-specific developments since January 2016 – except for the ones which
we can control for, such as the utilization rates of hotels at the city level.
6 Analysis of hotel room availability across channels
6.1 Cross sectional observations
Finding 1: Hotel prices are most often published at the OTAs Booking.com,
Expedia and HRS
In our data set, Booking.com is the channel that exhibits the highest penetration as 94%
of all hotels publish prices there at least once, followed by Expedia with about 50% (Table
2, first data column). Across the covered countries, 16% of all hotels make use of the OTA
HRS. In contrast, for Germany, 50% of all observed hotels had offers listed at least once
21See Annex IV for an overview of the decisions.
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at HRS (country statistics not reported individually). This can be attributed to the fact
that HRS is a German incumbent.
Table 2: Channel use
Channel (major channels only) Fraction of hotels that
used channel at least
once
Frequency of channel
use (given hotel used it
at least once)
Direct channel (total) 10% 82%
Direct channel (service provider) 4% 62%
Direct channel (own interface) 7% 94%
Booking.com 94% 88%
Expedia 46% 90%
HRS 16% 88%
Base All 46,223 hotels
observed during the
observation period
All Kayak requests of
hotels where the
channel has been used
at least once
Finding 2: Direct online channel prices are available in about 14% of all Kayak
requests
We observe prices on the direct online channel on Kayak at least once for approximately
10% of all hotels. Out of these hotels, about two thirds can be identified as hotels that
have their own booking engine connected to Kayak, whereas the other third uses service
providers such as FastBooking. Among the 15 million Kayak requests, a direct channel
offer is contained in 14% of all requests on Kayak.
The hotels do not always list offers at an OTA or their direct channel (Table 2, third
column). A usage frequency of a channel below 100% could arise either if a large fraction
of hotels starts or ceases to use this channel during the observation period. Another pos-
sibility is that hotels have the ability to react more flexibly to changing market conditions
on this channel. On average, a hotel that is at least once listed with an OTA offers rooms
on it in almost 90% of all Kayak requests. Hotels with an own booking engine exhibit a
similar frequency as OTAs, while the direct channel via a service provider is only used
in 60% of all requests. This may be an indication that adoption or termination is a
prevalent phenomenon for this channel or that hotels using a service provider react more
flexibly to changing market conditions with respect to direct channel offers. A higher
usage frequency at OTAs may be, for example, caused by OTAs’ availability parities.
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Finding 3: The availability frequencies vary by country – but are comparable
for Booking.com and Expedia in Europe
Table 3: Summary statistics by countries
Number of
listings
Frequency
Book-
ing.com
Frequency
Expedia
Frequency
HRS
Frequency
direct channel
Germany 5.2 80% 60% 64% 16%
France 5.1 88% 74% 13% 22%
Italy 3.4 83% 52% 6% 4%
Sweden 4.5 94% 71% 12% 20%
Austria 3.5 92% 45% 27% 11%
Canada 5.4 90% 83% 3% 38%
The number of channels with price publications at Kayak for an average hotel room
request differ by country and range from 3.5 listings in Italy and Austria, 4.5 listings in
Sweden up to 5.4 listings in Canada (Table 3, data column 1).
In all countries Booking.com is the mostly used channel with a frequency ranging from
80% in Germany to 94% in Sweden. Number two is Expedia with frequencies from 45%
in Austria to 83% in Canada.
Compared to the channels Booking.com and Expedia that are very prevalent in all coun-
tries of the data set, the presence of the German OTA HRS varies more across countries.
HRS is especially present in Germany (60%) and Austria (45%), while it appears only in
3% of all Canadian Kayak requests.
The direct channel also exhibits a high variation across countries, with only 4% in Italy
and an extraordinary 38% in Canada. One has to take into account that a meta search
site such as Kayak does not obtain direct online channel information automatically. The
variation across countries may, therefore, be due to different degrees in the use of interface
software or service providers which transfer this information to sites such as Kayak.
6.2 Effects of Booking.com’s removal of the narrow best price
clause in Germany on the availability of price offers
For all countries the frequency of price publications at Booking.com increase over time
(Figure 1). This indicates Booking.com’s growing importance in online hotel distribution.
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The frequency in Germany starts from an average level of around 73% and exhibits the
sharpest increase in the observation period.
Figure 1: Booking.com listing frequency at Kayak by country
We analyze below whether this can be attributed to the abolition of Booking.com’s BPCs
in Germany, as the implied less restrictive contract terms might make it more attractive
for hotels to list with Booking.com. The following regressions address the intensive and
extensive publications decisions (Conjectures 1 and 2).
Finding 4: On the extensive margin, there is a distinctive increase in the
frequency of publications at Booking.com in Germany , and also increases at
Expedia, the direct channel and HRS
According to Conjecture 1, a reduction in the scope of a BPC yields an increase in price
publications at the extensive margin, especially for the OTA that narrows down its BPC.
This can be tested for Germany where Booking.com had to waive its narrow BPC from
February 2016 onwards.
We test this conjecture with a data set where each observation is a hotel in a specific
month. The dependent variable equals 100 if a particular channel (such as Booking.com)
was used by the hotel at least once in that particular month according to the Kayak
data, and 0 otherwise. The linear country-specific trend captures whether hotels use the
channel in later months but not early in 2016 (extensive use). The variable “Share of
non-listed hotels” is the monthly average for the respective location.22 The regression
results are reported in Table 4.
22The control variables for the time interval between booking and travel date and the weekday of the
first travel day are not included.
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The second data column of Table 4 shows a positive trend in the share of hotels using
Booking.com at least once in each month. Each month, the share of hotels using Book-
ing.com increases by three percentage points (pp) in Germany. The coefficients on the
interactions of the time trend with the other countries (i.e. the deviations from the Ger-
man trend) are significantly negative. These time trends are thus less pronounced for
the other countries where no change in the BPC regime took place in the investigated
time frame. The negative deviations (in absolute values) from the German trend range
from 0.8 pp in Italy to approximately 3 pp in Canada and Sweden, where the trend of
Booking.com’s price publications frequencies is close to zero.
Table 4: Extensive channel use (at least once in a month)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Booking.com Expedia HRS
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.19∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
∆ Trend France 0.39∗∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.05
∆ Trend Italy -0.10∗∗ -0.83∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗
∆ Trend Sweden -0.33∗∗∗ -3.09∗∗∗ -0.17 -0.02
∆ Trend Austria 0.43∗∗∗ -1.83∗∗∗ -0.09 0.09
∆ Trend Canada -0.18∗∗ -2.93∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗ -0.10∗∗
∆ Trend Other countries -0.26∗∗∗ -3.07∗∗∗ 0.02 -0.08∗
Share of non-listed hotels -0.11 -21.07∗∗∗ 2.88∗∗∗ -0.14
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 220,233 220,233 220,233 220,233
R2 0.005 0.066 0.005 0.001
Adjusted R2 0.005 0.066 0.005 0.001
Within R2 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.00
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Moreover, the increase for Booking.com in Germany is stronger than for the other chan-
nels (compare the increase in Booking.com price availabilities with the other channels
in data columns 1, 3 and 4 of Table 4). The significant and positive coefficient on the
extensive direct channel use of 0.19 pp in data column 1 might allude to the fact that
Booking.com’s narrow BPC indeed put a considerable constraint on the direct channel.
After its abolition, it might be reasonable for more hotels to engage into direct online
sales. Interestingly, in France, where narrow BPCs were already abolished in July 2015,
and in Austria, where an abolition of the narrow BPCs is expected,23 the increase of the
23See http://hotelanalyst.co.uk/2016/08/01/austria-moves-on-rate-parity/; last accessed 30 August,
2016.
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direct channel use at the extensive margin is even stronger than in Germany during the
observation period (by ∆0.39 and ∆0.43 pp per month). Due to the (expected) abolition
of BPCs from all OTAs, it seems that the increased direct channel adoption in these
countries is even stronger than the increasing adoption in Germany in reaction to the
abolition of Booking.com’s BPC.
The regressions on the extensive channel use of Booking.com confirm Conjecture 1: there
is a significant positive trend in the extensive channel use of Booking.com following the
removal of its narrow BPC in Germany that is significantly stronger than in the other
countries. The other sales channels in Germany seem to be also positively affected by
the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC (although the picture across countries is less
clear). That the increase in the extensive channel use is strongest for Booking.com is in
line with the argument underlying Conjecture 1 that hotels are now particularly willing
to register with this OTA as they are not constrained by its BPC anymore.
Finding 5: On the intensive margin, there is a distinctive increase in the price
availabilities at Booking.com, Expedia and the direct channel in Germany
In the following we analyze the intensive channel use. According to Conjecture 2, price
parity and availability parity exert opposing effects on price availabilities at the intensive
margin. However, we expect that the price parity imposes a larger constraint on the price
publications decisions than the availability parity. As a consequence, the net impact of a
reduction in the scope of a BPC on the intensive channel use should be positive.
Additionally, the channels exempted from the BPC should be those that are mainly
affected from the policy change because these channels were mainly constrained by the
BPC at the intensive margin. In Germany, Booking.com had to abolish its narrow BPC
that explicitly only restricted the price setting on the direct online channel.
We test this conjecture with regressions where the dependent variable equals 100 if the
channel is present at the Kayak request, and 0 otherwise. We only include hotels which
used the respective channel already in January or February and measure whether the
channel is used more intensively in later months than early in 2016. Note that by this
rule, out of all observations, between 6% for Expedia and the direct channel to 14% for
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Booking.com are omitted in the regressions.24
The frequency of price publications at the intensive margin significantly increases over
time for the direct channel, Booking.com and Expedia in Germany (by 0.85, 0.43 and
0.19 pp each month according to the first data row in Table 5). By contrast, HRS
does not experience a time trend significantly different from zero in the intensive channel
use in Germany. The increase in intensive channel use is the largest in magnitude for
the direct channel. This confirms conjecture 2 as apparently the direct channel that
was the most constrained channel by Booking.com’s price parity. The increased use of
Expedia might indicate that hotels expect an abolition of Expedia’s narrow BPCs too, as
the Bundeskartellamt’s investigation against Expedia is still proceeding (Hunold (2016)).
The prohibition of HRS’s BPC has already taken place in December 2013, so that there
is arguably no significant adjustment process taking place anymore in 2016.
Table 5: Intensive channel use (if observed in February)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Booking.com Expedia HRS
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.85∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗ 0.01
∆ Trend France -2.84∗∗∗ -0.43∗∗∗ -0.40∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗
∆ Trend Italy -3.42∗∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗ -0.25∗∗∗ -1.38∗∗∗
∆ Trend Sweden -1.60∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -1.40∗∗∗
∆ Trend Austria 1.02 -0.25 -1.45∗∗∗ -2.11∗∗∗
∆ Trend Canada -1.55∗∗∗ -0.81∗∗∗ -0.51∗∗∗ -2.26∗∗∗
∆ Trend Other countries -2.98∗∗∗ -0.46∗∗∗ -0.88∗∗∗ -1.49∗∗∗
Share of non-listed hotels -28.66∗∗∗ -22.29∗∗∗ -31.00∗∗∗ -46.70∗∗∗
7 days before 0.09 0.18∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ 1.14∗∗∗
14 days before 0.63∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 1.15∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗∗
21 days before 0.74∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗∗
28 days before 0.90∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 3.02∗∗∗
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,022,658 11,116,947 8,615,682 2,986,772
R2 0.019 0.009 0.011 0.029
Adjusted R2 0.019 0.009 0.011 0.029
Within R2 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The coefficients for the deviations in the other countries are mostly significantly negative.
In several instances the country-specific deviation from the German trend is larger in
24Compare the number of observations in Table 5 with the total amount of Kayak requests in which
these OTAs are listed (Table 20 in Annex V).
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absolute values than the coefficient on the German trend (row 1), which suggests an
even negative trend. Note that we control for the local supply-demand balance by means
of the share of non-listed hotels, which has a both statistically and economically highly
significant negative coefficient.
The largest significantly negative deviations from the German trend can be observed for
the direct channel (data column 1) and range from approximately minus 1.6 pp in Sweden
and Canada to minus 3.42 pp in Italy. This suggests that the intensive direct channel
use is rather declining in these countries. The trend in Austria has a positive sign and is
not significantly different from the German trend, indicating a similar development as in
Germany.
For Booking.com (data column 2), the deviation of the French trend compared to the
German trend of minus 0.43 pp suggests that the changes in intensive use of Booking.com
are close to zero in France. The significant coefficients for the other countries – except for
Austria – are even more negative, indicating that the intensive Booking.com use decreased
in these countries as for the direct channel. Austria shows no significant deviation from
the German trend for both these channels. This might indicate that Austria already
undergoes a similar development as Germany after the Austrian NCA has announced to
also prohibit the narrow BPCs in Austria in the course of 2016.
The regression results confirm Conjecture 2 by indicating that the abolition of Book-
ing.com’s narrow BPC is related to an increase in the intensive channel use, and in
particular suggest that the constraint of BPCs on price publication decisions rather stems
from price parity clauses than from availability clauses. The narrow BPC required the
direct online channel price not to be lower than that at Booking.com. Now hotels publish
their prices more often also at Booking.com, although the availability parity has been
relaxed – possibly because setting lower prices at the direct channel than at Booking.com
is not punished as much anymore, while before hotels might just not have published offers
at Booking.com in such instances. The intensive channel use increases as well for Expedia
in Germany, possibly because hotels might treat Expedia as Booking.com in view of a
possible abolition of Expedia’s BPC in Germany. The German trend is distinctive from
the other jurisdictions where no policy change has taken place, except for Austria which
might be attributed to the announcement of the Austrian NCA to also abolish narrow
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BPC in 2016.
Finding 6: The increase in the price availability in Germany is not a pure
catch-up
The Booking.com price publication frequency in Germany starts from a considerably lower
level than the frequencies in the other countries at the beginning of the observation period
in 2016 (Figure 1). One might, therefore, wonder whether the increase in the publication
frequencies of Booking.com in Germany can be fully attributed to the prohibition of its
narrow BPC by the Bundeskartellamt.
An alternative hypothesis could be that Booking.com might undergo a general catch-
up process in regions where it is is less established. In order to distinguish between
these two effects, we computed a control group of non-German cities which exhibit the
same average publication frequency of Booking.com at the beginning of the observation
period. However, for these cities Booking.com’s publication frequency does not experience
a comparable increase as in Germany. This is contrary to the conjecture that the increase
of the Booking.com frequency is (only) due to a general catch-up process in regions that
had a low Booking.com listing share at the beginning of the observation period. See
Annex VI for a detailed description of the robustness check.
Additionally, we observe that the price availability frequencies of the other major OTAs in
Germany stay approximately constant during the observation period: the price availability
frequency of Expedia increased slightly from 64% in January to 69% in July, while the
HRS frequency decreased very slightly from 68% to 66%. This contradicts that there are
major changes in the competitive situation during the observation period which could
explain such a sharp increase of Booking.com’s price availability frequency.
7 Pricing across channels
7.1 Cross-sectional observations
To address Conjectures 3 and 4, we computed how often the direct channel price is strictly
below, equal, or strictly above the price of the major OTAs.
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Table 6: Comparison direct channel and Booking.com
Country N D < B D = B D > B
Germany 432,551 36% 49% 16%
France 575,372 35% 44% 21%
Italy 207,428 39% 34% 26%
Canada 407,988 29% 38% 33%
Sweden 76,533 43% 31% 26%
Austria 68,753 44% 34% 22%
Others 128,957 38% 36% 26%
Table 6 shows the price relation between Booking.com prices and direct channel prices for
all Kayak requests that contain prices from both channels (the number of such observations
is depicted in column 2). The analogous computations for the relation between the direct
channel and Expedia and HRS yielded similar results.
Finding 7: The direct channel price is not larger than the Booking.com price
in more than 75% of the cases
The instances in which the direct channel price is strictly larger than the Booking.com
price range from only 16% in Germany to 33% in Canada. This confirms our Conjecture
3 that the direct channel price is typically not above the price at an OTA. However, in a
significant minority of the cases the direct channel price is higher than the Booking.com
price. Such a price differentiation might be profitable for a hotel if it usually encounters
customer groups with a higher willingness to pay on the direct channel. An alternative
explanation is that – in countries where other OTAs enforce BPCs – the direct channel
price is bound by BPCs of other OTAs to be higher than on Booking.com.
Finding 8: The direct channel price is below the Booking.com price in more
than 1/3 of the cases, but least often in Canada – the wide BPC-country in
our data set
Across countries there is a remarkably large share of Kayak requests with a direct channel
price strictly below the Booking.com price (Table 6). This share is the highest in Sweden
(43%) and Austria (44%), and the lowest in the wide BPC country Canada (29%). As in
all countries – except of France throughout and Germany for Booking.com and HRS – at
least narrow BPCs are in place, this strongly suggests that direct channel prices covered
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by a BPC are nevertheless below the price at Booking.com in a considerable number of
cases. This is in contrast to Conjecture 4 and suggests that hotels are non-compliant
to the BPC on a regular basis. Nevertheless, that the violations of the BPC are least
frequent in Canada where the widest form of BPCs is in place indicates that BPCs do
have a disciplining effect on (some) hotels.
Finding 9: Compliance of the direct channel parity seems to be higher under
the wide BPCs in Canada than with narrow BPCs in Europe
An additional view on the relation between direct prices and Booking.com prices across
different BPC regimes yields the box plot in Figure 2. It shows the distribution of the
difference between direct price and the Booking.com price of all Kayak requests that
contain prices of both channels. The observations are grouped into the three BPC regimes
according to the country of observation, and in the case of Germany also according to the
month of observation.25
Figure 2: Relation between Booking.com and direct channel across BPC regimes
The box plots show that the difference of direct channel and Booking.com most often
ranges between ± 5 EUR and that price dispersion between the direct channel and Book-
ing.com is the lowest under the wide BPC in Canada. The dispersion is considerably
higher for the narrow BPC group and the group that is not subject to a BPC.
25For Germany, the observations from January are assigned to the narrow BPC and all observations
from February on are assigned to the group of no BPC which additionally contains France.
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This figure confirms that neither under the wide nor narrow BPC full compliance to the
price parity can be observed and that compliance is weaker under the narrow BPC than
under the wide BPC.
The latter finding is interesting in that one might expect the same compliance in relation
to the direct channel price under a narrow and a wide BPC as both restrict the direct
channel price not to be lower than the OTA price. The finding of less compliance in case
of narrow BPCs might be due to other restrictions that are relaxed in the narrow parity
clauses of Booking, such as limited punishments in case of non-compliance; the compe-
tition policy cases run against Booking.com might have also weakened to enforcement
power of Booking.com in non-contractual ways.
Finding 10: There is a unique price leader across channels in about half of all
observations, with an average relative difference to the second price of about
10%
There is a strict price leader in the sense of the second lowest price being strictly higher
than the lowest price in 49% of all Kayak requests with price offers from at least two
channels. The frequency of strict price leadership ranges from 40% in Germany to 60%
in Canada (Table 7, first data column).
For all Kayak requests with offers from at least two channels, Table 7 shows how often a
strict minimum price exists and – if it exists – how large the average relative difference
between the strict minimum price and the second lowest price is. In most reported
countries the relative difference between the minimum price and the second lowest price
is on average around 10%, with a notable exception of 22% in Italy (second data column).
However, in contrast to Conjecture 5, the scope of the BPCs in a country is not related to
the frequency of strict price leadership across channels in an obvious way. For instance, in
Canada strict price leadership is most frequent although wide BPCs are common, while
this share is the lowest in Germany where Booking.com and HRS are not allowed to use
BPC anymore, and Expedia only uses a narrow BPC.
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Table 7: Frequency of a unique price leader (strict minimum price) and deviation to
second lowest price
Country
Frequency of
unique price
leadership across
channels
Relative difference
to second lowest
price
Germany 40% 11%
France 52% 10%
Italy 50% 22%
Canada 60% 10%
Sweden 50% 10%
Austria 53% 12%
Others ( neighbor sample) 59% 15%
Discussion: Representativeness of the direct channel observations
Regarding the representativeness of the findings, recall that direct online prices are only
observed in 14% of all Kayak requests. The direct online channel is likely to be used by a
larger fraction of the hotels. It is not guaranteed that the direct channel listing observed
on Kayak are fully representative for all hotels with direct online channels. In particular,
it could be that larger hotels and chains with better IT capabilities and scale economies
are over-represented. It also cannot be excluded that some – potentially larger hotels or
hotel chains – have negotiated individual contracts with Booking.com that do not contain
parity clauses. For instance, there are large hotel chains in Sweden, and in this country
the direct prices are indeed strictly lower than the Booking.com price most of the time, as
mentioned above. However, we consider this unlikely to be the main or even only driver
of the above observations, but acknowledge that the actual non-compliance frequencies
might be slightly different for the whole hotel population.
With respect to the precision of the price relationship statistics, our manual validation
exercise we could correctly identify the price leader by means of Kayak data in more
than 90% of the cases (see Subsection 4.3 and Annex II for details). We take this as
an indication that Kayak correctly displays price relations across channels most of the
times. As a rule of thumb, one could consider 10 pp as a possible margin of error for the
bilateral price relationship statistics, i.e. consider a result only as robust when the “null
hypothesis” can be rejected by a margin at least 10 pp. Our results are robust in this
respect. Moreover, we acknowledge that the existence of a unique price leader might be
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affected to some extent by missing direct channel prices.
7.2 Effects of Booking.com’s removal of the narrow best price
clause in Germany on pricing
Finding 11: The direct channel is increasingly often cheaper than Booking
and Expedia in Germany
We conjecture that the prices at the direct channel and at Expedia are more often lower
than at Booking.com after the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany (Con-
jectures 6 and 7). In order to test these conjectures, we employ a similar regression
analysis as for the price availabilities. Table 8 shows the regressions results on the price
relations between Booking.com and the direct channel (column 1, “B>D”), Expedia and
the direct channel (column 2, “E>D”), Booking.com and Expedia (column 3, “B>E”)
and Booking.com and HRS (column 4, “B>H”).
The dependent variable is equal to 100 if the price in the first channel is strictly above
the price in the second channel (e.g., the Booking.com price strictly above the direct
channel for column 1), and zero otherwise. We again allow for country-specific time
trends to capture whether the price relation changes in Germany following the abolition
of Booking.com’s narrow BPCs and in how far the time trends in the other countries
deviate from the German time trend. We control for the share of non-listed hotels in the
city where the hotel is located, the time interval between booking and travel date and
include hotel fixed effects.
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Table 8: Price comparison
(1) (2) (3) (4)
B>D E>D B>E B>H
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.85∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ -1.33∗∗∗ -1.84∗∗∗
∆ Trend France -1.11∗∗∗ -1.93∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 1.21∗∗∗
∆ Trend Italy -1.04∗∗ -2.03∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗
∆ Trend Sweden 1.40∗∗∗ -2.53∗∗∗ 2.63∗∗∗ 1.40∗∗∗
∆ Trend Austria -2.39∗∗∗ -2.49∗∗∗ 0.58∗ 0.89∗∗
∆ Trend Canada 1.60∗∗∗ -2.23∗∗∗ 3.68∗∗∗ 4.44∗∗∗
∆ Trend Other countries 0.04 0.94 1.57∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗
Share of non-listed hotels -3.36∗∗∗ 4.05∗∗∗ -6.02∗∗∗ -12.32∗∗∗
7 days before 0.35 0.33 1.41∗∗∗ -0.36∗
14 days before 0.22 0.39∗ -0.30∗∗ 1.25∗∗∗
21 days before 1.45∗∗∗ 0.09 -0.75∗∗∗ 1.43∗∗∗
28 days before 2.20∗∗∗ 0.09 -0.19 2.63∗∗∗
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,754,006 1,785,838 6,977,803 2,365,892
R2 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.007
Within R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
With respect to conjecture 6, we consider the time trend of the relation between Book-
ing.com and the direct channel (column 1 of Table 8) in Germany. The significant coef-
ficient of 0.85 pp per month confirms that the price at Booking.com is increasingly often
above the direct channel price.
The coefficients on the other countries (row 2-7) indicate the deviations from the Ger-
man trend and, therefore, how the differences between the countries evolve over time.
The trends in France, Italy and Austria are significantly less positive, while they are sig-
nificantly more positive in Sweden and Canada than in Germany. It is an astonishing
result that especially in a wide BPC country like Canada this trend is the strongest in
magnitude . It indicates an increasing non-compliance to the BPCs in these countries, or
that – potentially large or chained – hotels increasingly agree with Booking.com on terms
without parity clauses.
Additionally, we observe in column 2 that the direct channel also becomes more often
cheaper than Expedia in Germany – despite that fact that Expedia still imposes a narrow
BPC. This shows that the compliance to Expedia’s price parity clause decreases more
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and more over time in Germany. As argued already before, in view of the ongoing Bun-
deskartellamt investigation, it might be that market participants anticipate an abolition
for Expedia’s BPC in Germany as well and incorporate this into their pricing.
We observe that over time the direct channel offers more often a lower price than Book-
ing.com and Expedia in Germany. Especially the result with respect to Booking.com is
in accordance with conjecture 6 that hotels make use of their new price setting freedom
after the abolition of a narrow BPC and set lower prices on their direct channel.
We also conjecture that Expedia prices might decrease relative to Booking.com’s prices
once there is no direct channel parity for Booking.com anymore, but still for Expedia
(Conjecture 7). However, note that the coefficient on the relation between Booking.com
and Expedia is significantly negative and equals minus 1.33 pp per month (column 3).
This regression result suggests that German hotels decided significantly more often to
offer lower prices at Booking.com rather than at Expedia.
We reject conjecture 7. Expedia, as the only major OTA in Germany left that still uses
narrow BPCs, did not achieve lower prices than Booking.com.
Finding 12: The direct channel is increasingly often the price leader in Ger-
many, and Booking.com less often
According to conjecture 8, the hotels’ direct online channel should more often have the
lowest price on offer (price leader) following the removal of Booking.com’s BPC. Corre-
spondingly, we expect Booking.com to become the price leader less often.
In order to test these conjectures we employ a similar regression analysis as for the price
availability. The dependent variable is equal to 100 if the direct channel (first data
column) or Booking.com (second data column) has the strictly lowest price on offer, and
is 0 otherwise. Anything else is as in the regressions in Table 8.
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Table 9: Channel is price leader (has the strictly lowest price)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct (str.) Direct Booking.com (str.) Booking.com
Trend (Base: Germany) 0.86∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗
∆ Trend France -1.60∗∗∗ -0.19 -0.03 0.61∗∗∗
∆ Trend Italy -1.37∗∗∗ -1.62∗∗∗ 0.08 -0.29∗∗∗
∆ Trend Sweden -2.29∗∗∗ 0.26 -0.52∗∗∗ -0.78∗∗∗
∆ Trend Austria -0.78 -1.14 -0.32∗ 0.06
∆ Trend Canada -0.68∗∗∗ -0.93∗∗∗ -1.13∗∗∗ -1.21∗∗∗
∆ Trend Other countries -0.41 -1.12∗∗ -0.04 -0.38∗∗∗
Share of non-listed hotels 7.06∗∗∗ -0.22 8.18∗∗∗ 9.48∗∗∗
7 days before -0.16 -0.26 -1.45∗∗∗ -1.85∗∗∗
14 days before -0.14 -1.84∗∗∗ -0.76∗∗∗ -1.36∗∗∗
21 days before 1.05∗∗∗ 1.69∗∗∗ -1.29∗∗∗ -1.36∗∗∗
28 days before 1.22∗∗∗ 2.10∗∗∗ -1.65∗∗∗ -1.88∗∗∗
Hotel FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekdays Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,958,106 1,958,106 12,046,948 12,046,948
R2 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.003
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.010 0.002 0.003
Within R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors not reported.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
In Germany, the direct online channel is significantly more often the price leader over time
(0.86 pp per month, see Table 9, data column 1). For all other countries the coefficients
indicating the difference from the German trend are negative, with particularly large and
significant values for France, Italy, Sweden, and Canada. For Austria, which as explained
before might undergo a similar development as Germany, the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero, but the net trend with a value 0.08 nevertheless close to zero.
This is reinforced by the result that the frequency with which Booking.com is the price
leader significantly decreases in Germany (minus 0.14 pp per month). Interestingly, Book-
ing.com is also less often the price leader in the other reported countries. This, however,
does not contradict the results with respect to the direct channel. It might be the case that
another OTA now more often has a cheaper price than Booking.com in these countries.
Taken together, the regression results provide a strong indication that the direct channel
in Germany is becoming the price leader more often due to the removal of Booking.com’s
narrow BPC – in line with Conjecture 8.
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8 Conclusion
Motivated by recent proceedings against best price clauses (BPC) imposed by online travel
agents (OTA), we empirically investigate the effects of such clauses using meta-search
price data of more than 45,000 hotels in various countries. We capture the abolition
of Booking.com’s narrow BPC during our observation period, so that we are able to
particularly address the competitive effects of narrow BPCs.
We have found an increased channel use – both at the intensive and the extensive margin
– which can be attributed to the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC in Germany.
Our difference-in-differences approach also revealed that the hotels are able to establish
the direct channel more frequently as the cheaper channel relative to the major OTAs
and also more frequently as the price leader in the sense of the cheapest channel across
all available online sales channels. This lets us conclude that Booking.com’s narrow BPC
did indeed restrict the hotel’s price setting.
With respect to the price structure across sales channels, we have found that hotels
set price at the direct channel lower than at the major OTA in about one third of our
observations across all BPC regimes in various countries. This suggests a wide-spread non-
compliance with the price parity clause. Nevertheless, the data suggest that especially the
wide BPC is to some extent effective in constraining price dispersion across sales channels.
We see scope for more empircal research with respect to best price clauses of online travel
agents. For instance, there might be major differences in the online sales strategies of
different types of hotels such as hotel chains and independent hotels. As a remedy, we
used hotel fixed effects in the analysis to accommodate for these factors. Nevertheless, it
would be interesting to be able to distinguish the effects of BPC on different types of hotels
more explicitly. In addition, we are still investigating the ongoing prohibition processes
in other countries such as Austria. Moreover, the theoretical contributions predict anti-
competitive effects of BPC that result in inflated commission rates and eventually retail
prices. Although we have not yet observed changes in the standard commission rates of
the major OTAs in Europe, future empirical research should take this again into account
in order to assess the long term effects and welfare implications of BPCs.
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Annex I: Countries and cities covered in data set
Tables 10 until 14 show the selected countries and cities covered in our data set. Data
collection started for the 25 biggest German cities (Table 11) and a control sample of 20
pairs of German and non-German cities along the German border (Table 12) in January
2016. In order to cover all three different BPC regimes in the data and to gather data for
countries in which future decisions on BPC are possible, the additional countries depicted
in Table 10 were subsequently included. For these countries, we chose a composition of
the fifteen biggest cities and fifteen largest travel destinations with the objective to gather
representative data across touristic and urban destinations for these countries.
Table 10: Countries covered in data set
Country Cities covered Start
Germany 25 biggest cities 25/01/2016
Various 20 pairs of cities near German border 27/01/2016
Italy 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 10/02/2016
Sweden 15 biggest cities and 14 tourist destinations 12/02/2016
Canada 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 12/02/2016
France 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 18/02/2016
Austria 15 biggest cities and 15 tourist destinations 20/04/2016
Table 11: Germany - TOP 25 cities
Germany TOP 25 cities
Berlin Stuttgart Leipzig Bochum Karlsruhe
Hamburg Dusseldorf Dresden Wuppertal Mannheim
Munich Dortmund Hanover Bielefeld Augsburg
Cologne Essen Nuremberg Bonn Wiesbaden
Frankfurt am Main Bremen Duisburg Munster Gelsenkirchen
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Table 12: Twin cities along German border
Pair German City Non-German neighbor Country of neighbor
1 Flensburg Kolding Denmark
2 Puttgarden/Fehmarn Rodby Denmark
3 Wilhelshaven Groningen The Netherlands
4 Borkum Schiermonnikoog The Netherlands
5 Rheine Enschede The Netherlands
6 Aachen Maastricht The Netherlands
7 Heringsdorf Wolin Poland
8 Greifswald Stettin Poland
9 Cottbus Zielona-Gora Poland
10 Trier Rosport Luxembourg
11 Monschau Eupen Belgium
12 Prüm St. Vith Belgium
13 Saarbrücken Metz France
14 Karlsruhe Strasbourg France
15 Freiburg Basel Switzerland
16 Konstanz St. Gall Switzerland
17 Oberstdorf Bad Ischl Austria
18 Garmisch-Partenkirchen Innsbruck Austria
19 Nuremberg Pilsen Czech Republic
20 Dresden Prague Czech Republic
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Table 13: Cities covered in data set
Italy Canada France Sweden Austria
Biggest Cities
Rome Toronto Paris Stockholm Vienna
Milan Montreal Marseille Göteborg Graz
Naples Vancouver Lyon Malmö Linz
Turin Calgary Toulouse Uppsala Salzburg
Palermo Edmonton Nice Västeras Innsbruck
Genoa Ottawa Nantes Örebro Klagenfurt
Bologna Québec Strasbourg Linköping Villach
Florence Winnipeg Montpellier Helsingborg Wels
Bari Hamilton Bordeaux Jönköping St. Pölten
Catania Kitchener Lille Norrköping Dornbirn
Venice London Rennes Lund Wiener Neustadt
Verona Victoria Reims Umea Steyr
Messina Saint Catharines Le Havre Gävle Feldkirch
Padua Halifax Saint-Étienne Boras Bregenz
Trieste Oshawa Toulon Eskilstuna Leonding
Tourist Destinations
Lecce Regina Grenoble Växjö Zell am See
Viareggio St. John’s Cannes Lulea Kitzbühel
Matera Fredericton Chambéry Falun Bad Hofgastein
Sanremo Charlotte Town Annecy Varberg Hermagor
Mantova Whitehorse Aix-les-Bains Visby Schladming
Vasto Yellowknife Menton Ystad Mittelberg
Merano Niagara On The Lake Albertville Kiruna Neustift
Caltagirone Whistler Bayeux Strömstad Bad Gastein
Montecatini
Terme
Banff Argelès-sur-Mer Ronneby Velden am Wörther
See
Narni Jasper Chamonix Jokkmokk Finkenstein am
Faaker See
Abano Terme Tofino Évian-les-Bains Grebbestad Kirchberg in Tirol
Ischia Dawson City Cavalaire-sur-
Mer
Marstrand St. Kanzian
Monte Argentario Churchill Saint-Gervais-
les-Bains
Jukkasjärvi Mayrhofen
San Felice Circeo Bay of Fundy Gruissan Stöllet Seefeld in Tirol
Santa Margherita
Ligure
Thousand Islands
National Park
Sainte-Marine Sölden
Selection of travel destinations
For Italy, Sweden, Canada, France and Austria we selected the travel destinations in two
steps. First, we looked up the fifteen biggest cities in terms of population on Wikipedia re-
spectively. Additionally, for each country, we collected information about popular tourist
destinations from travel guides and official tourism websites. We then ordered all these
destinations by population and took again the fifteen biggest locations. For Italy, France,
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Sweden and Canada the websites were all accessed in January and February 2016. The
Austrian cities were selected in April 2016 after the Austrian NCA announced to proceed
against the narrow BPC later in 2016.
The sources of the travel destinations can be found in the following table:
Table 14: Sources for travel destination selection
Country Type Source
Italy Listing of health resorts wikipedia.de
Ten most popular beaches telegraph.co.uk
Beyond Rome and Florence: 12
alternative Italian destinations
cnn.com
Sweden Top 10 Places in Sweden neverstoptraveling.com
Top 10 Green Attractions visitsweden.com
Canada Travelers Choice tripadvisor.com
Tourist attractions planetware.com
Places to Go de-keepexploring.canada.travel
France The top 10 beach holidays telegraph.co.uk
Travelers Choice Destinations tripadvisor.com
16 Top-Rated Tourist Attractions in
the French Alps
planetware.com
Austria Most popular winter destinations austriatourism.at
Most popular summer destinations austriatourism.at
Annex II: Validation of Kayak data
As mentioned in 4.3, to validate the accuracy of the offers listed on Kayak we have
compared prices and qualitative features of 171 hotels on Kayak with corresponding offers
on the websites of the major OTAs and the hotel websites.
We generated our validation sample as follows. From all hotels that we observed in our
data we took a random draw of 115 hotels. We augmented the sample with 58 hotels
from Germany, Austria and Sweden that we observed to frequently offer a direct sales
channel on Kayak. We did this to obtain more observations with direct channel prices as
well as HRS prices and to have a better coverage of the countries Germany, Austria and
Sweden. Consequently, the sample consists of observations from Canada, Italy, Sweden,
Germany, Austria and France plus a few observations for the Czech Republic, Switzerland
and Poland. For 40 hotels of our sample Kayak did not display any information during
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the enquiry period for various travel dates.
From a request on Kayak we obtain room rates for all available sales channels and infor-
mation on room features (e.g. double bed) and booking conditions (e.g. free cancellation,
free breakfast, etc.). We used the forwarding links on the Kayak website to reach the
corresponding offer on the OTAs and the hotel websites. With the gathered data we
conducted two kinds of consistency validations. First, we compare prices and qualitative
characteristics of a room offer on Kayak with the corresponding offer on the OTAs or
on the hotel website. Second, we verify whether the price structure between the major
OTAs and the direct sales channel shown on Kayak is consistent with the price structure
on OTAs and hotel websites. In eight cases on Kayak the qualitative features differed
across the sales channels. As prices are not comparable across channels in these cases,
the observations are excluded from the analysis of the price structure.
As shown in Table 15 we observe that prices coincide in more than two-thirds of all
observations on both sources. For this comparison we have assumed that prices coincide
if the difference amounts to less than three EUR in order to capture differences in rounding
and exchange rates.26 For deviating prices, the data suggest that prices on Kayak most
often are higher than the prices on OTAs and websites and that only in a few cases prices
on Kayak are lower than on the actual sales channel. Interestingly, the sales channel that
is measured most accurately is the direct sales channel. On average, prices on Kayak and
prices on the OTAs or the hotel websites deviate from each other by approximately five
EUR. Comparing the room features and booking conditions on both sources, we found
that this information on Kayak is identical with the information provided on the OTA or
the hotel website, whenever rooms were available on both sources.
Table 15: Frequency of price deviations of Kayak from OTAs and hotel websites
N Kayak pricehigher
Kayak price
equal
Kayak price
lower
Booking.com 106 26% 69% 5%
Expedia 64 34% 66% 0%
HRS 34 29% 68% 3%
Direct channel 51 12% 80% 8%
26Expedia displays an exact amount including euros and cents for a hotel room, while Booking.com
usually adjusts prices upwards to the next integer. Moreover, prices from Sweden or Canada sometimes
were displayed in domestic currencies. For the sake of comparability, we converted the prices in EUR
using the exchange rate of the booking date (Source: www.finanzen.net/waehrungsrechner/).
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However, in some cases Kayak displayed for a certain hotel on a certain sales channel
more than one available combination of room features and booking conditions.27 In order
to ensure comparability among sales channels in the second consistency validation, we
only compared hotel offers of different sales channels with each other if these offers were
qualitatively identical. In more than 90% the offers on all sales channels were qualitatively
identical regarding room features and booking conditions. Among these offers we identify
a price leadership whenever the lowest price is at least 1 EUR lower than the second
lowest price. Table 16 shows that the information whether one sales channel is the price
leader (i.e. offers a price strictly lower than the second best and qualitatively identical
offer) is consistent between Kayak and the actual sales channels in approximately 90%.
If there is a distinct price leader the average difference between the lowest price and the
second lowest price is around 7.50 EUR both on Kayak and on the sales channels.
Table 16: Consistency of price leadership
Price leadership N Price leadership consistent
Booking.com 67 91%
Expedia 54 92%
HRS 26 90%
Direct channel 34 85%
Annex III: Evidence on commission rates of OTAs
We understand that major OTAs such as Booking.com and Expedia use an agency model
where hotels set room prices on the OTA and pay a commission to the OTA for every
realized booking via the OTA. We understand that effective commissions are determined
by a standard rate plus an additional fee if hotels want to appear higher in the OTA’s
ranking.28 The interventions against BPCs aimed at removing restraints of competition
among OTAs in commission rates. However, the recent interventions have not obviously
27E.g. It is possible that Kayak indicated that on Booking.com there is one standard double room
with free breakfast for 100 EUR and that there is on superior double room without breakfast for 110
EUR. For the same hotel request on Kayak it also is possible that Expedia only has the superior room
without breakfast on offer. We then compared the superior room across channels.
28For example via Expedia’s hotel accelerator program that sells higher ranking positions by auction
(see https://skift.com/2016/03/03/first-look-at-expedias-hotel-accelerator-program-for-improving-hotel-
placement/; last accessed 25 September, 2016) or Booking.com’s preferred partner program (see
http://www.booking.com/content/hotel-help.de.html; last accessed 25 September, 2016).
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led to significant changes in the OTAs’ commission rates so far. A recent 29 Europe-wide
survey among more than 2,000 hoteliers by HOTREC finds that for more than 90% of all
hotels the effective commission rates have not decreased over the past one year.30
Our anecdotal examination (including interviews with hoteliers) in the course of 2016
indicates that basis commission rates of the major OTAs range between 12% and 18% in
Europe. While we took note of basis commissions of 15% at Expedia and HRS, Book-
ing.com’s basis commissions apparently vary across destinations (see Table 17 for the ob-
servations). Similarily, the Bundeskartellamt reported in the decisions regarding HRS31
and Booking.com32 that in 2013 and in 2015 the major OTAs’ basis commission rates
range from 10% to 15%. This also indicates that in Germany (basis) commissions have
not changed in the last years.
Table 17: Booking.com’s standard commissions by destination
Düsseldorf Berlin Termoli Rome Örebro Stockholm Toulouse Paris
12% 15% 15% 18% 15% 15% 17% 15%
According to the Bundeskartellamt, effective commissions can account for up to 50% of
the room price.33 In 2015, the German hotel association estimated average commissions
payments to range between 20% and 25%.34
29HOTREC is the European trade association of hotels, restaurants and cafes in Europe.
30HOTREC survey on online platforms of 2016 (see http://www.hotrec.eu/newsroom/press-releases-
1714/dominant-online-platforms-gaining-market-share-in-travel-trade-no-signs-of-increased-competition-
between-online-travel-agents-unveils-european-hotel-distribution-study.aspx; last accessed 03 September,
2016).
31Bundeskartellamt (2013) B9-66-10 Par. 225
32Bundeskartellamt (2015) B9-121-13 Par. 18.
33Bundeskartellamt (2015) B9-121-13 Par. 2.
34Statement of the German hotel association from August 31, 2015 according to Bundeskartellamt
(2015) B9-121-13, Fn 414.
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Annex IV: Public decisions with respect to BPCs of
OTAs in Europe
Table 18: List of public decisions with respect to BPCs
Date Country
Decision
body
Content Reference
01/2014 UK OFT OFT decision
Decision 31.01.2014, OFT1514dec –
Case reference CE/9320/10
12/2013 Germany
Bundes-
kartellamt
Prohibition
Decision of 20.12.2013, B 9 – 66/10
– HRS - Hotel Reservation Service
04/2015 Sweden
Konkurrens-
verket
Acceptance of
Booking.com’s
commitment to at most
narrow BPCs with effect
of July 2015
Decision of 15.04.2015 – 596/2013 –
Booking.com
“ France
Autorité de la
concurrence
“
Decision of 21.04.2015 – 15-D-06 –
Booking.com
“ Italy
Autorità
Garante della
Concorrenza e
del Mercato
“
Decision of 21.04.2015 – I779 –
Booking.com
2015 UK Court decision
OFT decision was
annulled on appeal on
procedural grounds
CMA press release, 16.09.2015,
CMA closes hotel online booking
investigation.a
07/2015 EU/EEA Expedia
Announces to use narrow
BPCs in Europe
Expedia press release 01.07.2015;
„Expedia Amends Rate, Conditions
and Availability Parity Clauses“.b
07/2015 France
French
parliament
Law that prohibits BPCs
for OTAs in France
„Loi Macron“ 10.07.2015.c
12/2015 Germany
Bundes-
kartellamt
Prohibitions of
Booking.com’s narrow
BPCs by February 2016.
Announcement to
continue investigation
with Expedia
Bundeskartellamt, decision of
23.12.2015, B 9-121/13 –
Booking.com.
07/2016 Austria Ministerrat
Government bill to
prohibit narrow BPCs for
OTAs in Austria. To be
adopted in the course of
2016
Government bill (1251 d.B.)
aSee https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cma-closes-hotel-online-booking-investigation. (last access
11.04.2016)
bSee http://www.expediainc.com/news-release/?aid=123242&fid=99&yy=2015, last access 11.04.2016.
cSee http://www.hotelnewsnow.com/Article/16460/Frances-end-to-rate-parity-creates-grey-areas for more infor-
mation, last access 27.04.2016.
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Annex V: Definition of OTAs and direct sales channels
In our data set, we observe 73 distinct sales channels that list hotel rooms on Kayak.
These can be classified into OTAs like Booking.com, and the direct hotel channel. Taking
together all hotel offers out of all Kayak requests, we observe in total more than 66 million
price offers. Table 19 lists the 15 most observed sales channels that account for almost
90% of all observed price offers. Booking.com is the most frequent channel in our data
set accounting for almost 20% of all price observations.
Table 19: Sales channels observed on Kayak
Sales Channel No. %
BOOKINGDOTCOM 12887457 19.5
HOTELSDOTCOM 9136874 13.8
EXPEDIAHOTEL 9085679 13.7
HOTELRESERVIERUNG 4319986 6.5
EBOOKERSHOTEL 4313642 6.5
AGODA 3311827 5.0
HRS 3301302 5.0
HOTELOPIA 2152581 3.3
AMOMA 2082432 3.1
HOTELSCLICK 2034302 3.1
OTEL 1519277 2.3
LOWCOSTHOLIDAYS 1362477 2.1
VENERE 1106848 1.7
HOTELTRAVEL 905966 1.4
PWOPODOHOTEL 676716 1.0
Total 66137388 100.0
It is noteworthy that the well known OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS belong to
company groups which own further OTAs (Table 22). Together the three company groups
account for almost 2/3 of our price observations. For these Kayak requests in which two
OTAs of the same company group are observed together (column 4), we computed how
often the prices are identical (column 5).
As a benchmark, we also compared the primary OTAs Booking.com, Expedia and HRS
in Tables 20 and 21. Table 20 shows how frequently the OTAs appear together in one
Kayak request. For those Kayak requests in which two OTAs are observed together, we
find that prices are equal in less than 50% (Table 21).
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Table 20: Contingency of OTA Listings
Booking.com Expedia HRS
Booking.com 12,887,457
Expedia 7,451,659 9,085,679
HRS 2,772,150 2,597,228 3,301,302
Table 21: Price coherence on major OTAs
Booking.com Expedia HRS
Booking.com 100%
Expedia 42% 100%
HRS 51% 48% 100%
We conducted the same analysis with OTAs belonging to the same company group. The
OTA Agoda that belongs to the Priceline Group appears in more than 80% with the
primary website Booking.com. For the OTAs belonging to Expedia Inc. (Hotels.com,
Venere, ebookers) the mutual appearance with the primary website Expedia is at almost
100% of all observations. The Expedia website prices are also very often equal to the prices
at Hotels.com and Venere,35 which suggests to treat them as one entity. For ebookers a
abrupt change in pricing policy can be observed between May and June 2016. While
ebookers used to have a price parity with Expedia in only 18% of all Kayak requests until
May, this value increased in June and July to 90%. Therefore, also Expedia and ebookers
is treated as one entity.
Interestingly, the correspondence between Booking.com and Agoda is quite low. As a
consequence, we treat them as separate OTAs. Finally, we also treat HRS and Hotel.de
as separate as the mutual appearance between HRS and Hotel.de is at only 44% and
also the coherence is only moderate and Hotel.de is quite small with only 1% of all price
listings.
35Note that the OTA Venere is observed on Kayak only in January and February 2016.
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Table 22: Price coherence within company groups
Group OTA Share in total
price listings
Appearance
with primary
website
Price coherence
with primary
website
Priceline Booking.com 19% 100% 100%Agoda 5% 84% 39%
Expedia Inc.
Expedia 14% 100% 100%
Hotels.com 14% 98% 92%
Venere 2% 98% 98%
ebookers 5% 95% 50%
HRS Robert
Ragge GmbH
HRS 5% 100% 100%
Hotel.de 1% 44% 75%
Annex VI: Increase of Booking.com’s listing frequency
in Germany - robustness check
As argued in subsection 6, the interpretation of the analysis of the listing decisions sug-
gests that there is distinctive increase in Booking.com’s listing frequencies that can be
attributed to the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC early in 2016. Alternatively,
Booking.com might undergo a general catch-up process in regions where it is is less es-
tablished.
However, to descriptively verify the robustness of this result, we conducted a comparison
between the evolvement of Booking.com’s listing frequency in Germany and in a control
group. The control group comprises of nine non-German cities that, on average, exhibit
the same frequency Booking.com listing frequency as it can be observed in Germany at
the beginning of 2016. The cities of the control group were selected as follows:
At the city level, we computed for every month the average Booking.com frequency.
Taking the nine non-German cities with the lowest Booking.com frequency in February
yields approximately the same average Booking.com frequency as for Germany as a whole
(74.5%, while 72.6% in Germany). These cities are Rome, Venice, Ischia (all Italy), Rodby
(Denmark), Dawson City, Yellowknife, Gananoque (Ottawa), Tofino, St. Catharines (all
Canada). Figure 3 shows how Booking.com frequencies evolve over time for the two
groups. As seen in subsection 6, in Germany the frequency increases sharply from 73%
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in February to 96% in June and July. The listing frequency of the control sample has the
same frequency level at the beginning of the year. But in contrast to Germany, the control
sample increases only slightly until May to a frequency of 77.6% and shows a decreasing
trend from then on ending up even below the February level at 73.7% in July.
Hence, we conclude from the comparison of Germany with a control sample consisting of
nine cities from Europe and Canada that there is no general catch-up process in regions
with low Booking.com frequencies that drives the development in Germany. In turn,
this result is taken as supporting evidence that the abolition of Booking.com’s BPCs in
Germany can be contributed to the especially sharp increase of Booking.com listings in
Germany.
Figure 3: Booking.com Frequency (Germany and control group)
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